Tuesday 16 June 2015

Taming the Ugly monster Boko Haram


 
The inaugural speech of the former general, President Buhari on 29th May, 2015 declared that the military command and control Centre of Nigeria be relocated to Maiduguri until the insurgency is subdued. This was the president workout plan for defeating the Boko haram.

This came as a result of studies made over the years by a number of committees on Boko Haram crisis and made recommendations to the federal government on the best methods to apply to end it. In addition to the wealth of his experience to tap from in confronting the issue, President Buhari would find the works of the various presidential committees that were set up to investigate the menace very handy and timely.

Among such committee reports that have been collecting dust on shelves in the Presidency, is the Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North-East zone, popularly known as the Galtimari Committee, named after its chairman, Amb. Usman G. Galtimari
 

In the report it submitted to the federal government in 2011, the commission, firstly, traced the genesis of the Boko Haram to private militias that were formed by politicians in the run-up to the 2003 general elections, made a number of recommendations on the ways to tackle them. Some of the findings and recommendations are highlighted here.

“The militias (Boko Haram) were allegedly armed and used extensively as political thugs,” during the polls, the report which the federal government accepted and issued a white paper in 2012, said. The thugs were abandoned afterwards “since they (the politicians) could not continue funding and keeping them employed.” “With no visible means of sustenance, some of the militias gravitated towards religious extremism, the type offered by Mohammed Yusuf,” the report added.

It therefore, recommended for the federal government to “direct the security agencies to beam their searchlight on some politicians who sponsored, funded and used the militia groups that later metamorphosed into Boko Haram and bring them to justice.”

Similarly, the committee observed a lack of “attempts by government and security services to understand the ideology and motives” of the group by engaging them in dialogue and advised for “urgent need to constructively engage and dialogue with the leadership of the sect” from a position of strength, “by allowing the security forces to dominate the environment.” The committee further recommended that the proposed dialogue should be on the condition of the sect’s renunciation of violence and surrendering of arms.

The report also identified proliferation and circulation of illicit weapons in the country, with some of the armament imported “from crisis-torn contagious countries….due to porous and poorly manned borders arising from underfunding of the para-military agencies.” It added that other sources of the weapons are from unpatriotic members of security forces and magazines of quarry companies. To block the loopholes, the report suggested tighter border control by adequately funded, trained and equipped security and para-military agencies. 

One of the major obstacles to efforts at checking the sect was the judiciary, according to the report. “Oftentimes, suspects arraigned before the courts were set free on technical grounds, such suspects are usually recycled back into the society to continue to unleash mayhem,” it noted. The committee cited an example with the discharge of the slain leader of the sect, Yusuf, on two occasions by an Abuja court, observing that the decision made “a hero out of him, as the reception accorded him upon his return to Maiduguri attracted a mammoth crowd that temporarily undermined state authority, and served as an avenue for him to attract additional membership into the sect.”

It thus, recommended that the judiciary be sensitized on the need “to be mindful of the security implications of granting bails to terror suspects.”

Equally, the Galtimari report identified the immediate cause of Boko Haram escalation of violence to the “extra-judicial killing” of its leader and followers in 2009, as well as the “failure of police authorities to bring the culprits to justice.”

“The killing of Mohammed Yusuf, which was captured and circulated by video clips, was described as horrific, barbaric and unprofessional,” it observed, noting that no white paper was issued on the outcome of an inquiry ordered by the late President Umaru Yar’Adua into police handling of the case. “The Boko Haram sect members believed that their leader and members were unjustifiably killed,” the report stated and charged government to prosecute the police personnel responsible for the “extra-judicial murder” of the sect leader and his followers and o publicize the trial.

Although the committee observed that the Joint Task Force (JTF) that was deployed to Maiduguri at the time, had succeeded in bringing the situation under control, with “schools and markets that had closed at the height of the crisis … re-opening,” it recorded allegations against the JTF, “bordering on rape, destruction of property belonging to sect members, extra-judicial killings and harassment and intimidation of Maiduguri residents.”

The Galtimari report also stated that Boko Haram members received training and equipment from the “Sahara Desert.” It also disclosed reports about transportation “routes from Chad to Nigeria, through Gamboru/Ngala border where trucks destined for Nigeria were loaded with goods and weapons, possibly meant for terrorists and criminals.” Other identified routes are Tetewa from Cameroon through Bosso and Tudud Mota into Saga, it said.

It recommended for the improvement of border security, “which would, in turn, degrade the efficiency of the terrorist groups, whose members include illegal aliens, using the cover of the ECOWAS Free Movement

He finally suggested that  the government should focus on the social-economic situation of the country, with the view of creating job opportunities for the youths and also organizing skills acquisition program to be fully empowered.

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